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  The assumption of Democratic control of Congress last year and the probability 
that its majority will be increased by this year’s elections portends a growing, deeply 
troubling ideological split within its ranks, already visible, on matters of economic policy 
generally and regulatory policy specifically—between the more radical (and at the same 
time reactionary) populists, who label themselves “Progressives”, and the 20
th century 
liberals, who have dominated in the formulation of their party’s economic programs for 
the last three-quarters century. 
 
This paper examines the economic issues on which the two are likely to diverge, 
defending and proposing policies consistent with historical 18
th through 20
th century 
liberalism:   
 
  international trade policy, in which the “Progressives” demonstrate a formidable 
misinterpretation of our huge trade deficits and insufficient appreciation of the major 
contribution of retaliatory beggar-my-neighbor policies to intensifying the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s; 
  threatened recartelization of industries deregulated in the 1970’s and 80’s—such as 
the airlines, trucking, and telecommunications;  
  recourse to wage and price controls rather than monetary policy as a curb on inflation; 
  recourse to concerted anti-competitive restrictions or rationing rather than market 
pricing as a remedy for congestion, and 
  proposed laws imposing “network neutrality” obligations on providers of access to 
the Internet. 



















I.  Open Market Principles of Liberals, Past and Present  2 
 
Eighteenth to 20
th Century Liberalism  2 
Statutory Cartelization:  The Effect of the Great Depression of the 1930s  6 
Partial Resurrection of Liberalism in the Later New Deal  7 
 
II.  Enter the Latter-Day “Progressives”:  International Economic Policy  8 
 
Free Trade, Protectionism, and Globalization  8 
Agricultural Subsidization and Protectionism  10 
Balance of Trade Deficits  12 
Labor Protective Conditions  13 
Quotas on Japanese Cars  14 
 
III.  Domestic Policy:  Recartelization in the 1930’s, Decartelization in the ‘70’s and 
“Progressive” Recidivism in the ’90’s and ‘00’s  15 
 
Regulatory Cartelization  15 
Wage and Price Controls  16 
Deregulation 17 
“Progressive” Recidivism  18 
Bumping Rules for Airlines  21 
Congestion and Congestion Pricing  24 
Airline Passenger “Bills of Rights”  27 
Energy Policy  28 
 
IV.  “Network Neutrality”—The Unseemly Rush to Regulate  29 
 
From the “Commons”—No Charge—to No “Discriminatory” Charges  29 
 
V.  An Olive Branch to “Progressives”:  A Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, 
Consumer Protection, and Preservation of an Obligation to Serve  35 
 
The Conflicting Conceptions of Antitrust  35 
The Verizon Blunder:  Does it demonstrate the need for network neutrality 
 legislation?  38 




The Threat of Latter-Day “Progressives” to an Authentically Liberal Economic Policy 
 
Alfred E. Kahn 
 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 
 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.” 
 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.” 
 
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 1865 
 
The early hopes generated by the Democratic electoral victories in the fall of 2006 that 
their new Congressional majorities might obstruct or overturn some of the most reactionary 
policies of the Bush Presidency were soon dashed by the gradual realization that the majorities 
were neither veto- nor filibuster-proof.  Removal of those impediments in the fall of 2008 
elections would still leave those Democratic majorities hobbled by the worrisome schisms within 
their ranks between people who consider themselves Liberals, the “Vital Center” defined and 
eloquently defended by the late Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his 1949 book of that title—and 
others, former “radicals” and populists, who today call themselves “Progressives”.  Not the least 
crime of the latter group has been its hijacking of the banner originally raised by the Wisconsin 
LaFollettes, carried on to this day by such worthies as Will Marshall’s Progressive Policy 
Institute and the Democratic Leadership Council, originally manned by refugees from the Carter 
Administration and chaired by then-Governor Bill Clinton.  There is an instructive historical 
parallel here as we approach the 60
th anniversary of Henry Wallace’s quixotic run for the 
Presidency under that same banner.  Hillary Clinton’s public adoption of that same P-banner, 
shedding the political baggage attached by conservatives and reactionaries to the L-word—tying 
it explicitly, however, to the LaFollette rather than the Wallace or the current populist version—
gave these distinctions real currency (and, incidentally, have virtually forced me to vote for her, 




The political and economic philosophies and programs of these two groups—as of their 
opponent conservatives and reactionaries—are at the heart of our intellectual and political history 
of the last two hundred fifty years or so, reaching back before 1776—the publication date of 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.  It is the difference in their attitudes towards economic 
regulation, broadly defined, that I attempt to expose here, on the basis of long historical 
experience. 
  A distinguished expositor and proponent of liberalism has admonished me in a private 
communication that “it is impossible to give these two terms [‘Progressives’ and ‘Liberals’] a 
consistent interpretation over historical periods.”  That observation is of course correct, as a 
statement of fact, and I endorse his warning about the changes over time in the programs of these 
several parties—as the economy overall has gone through major cycles of prosperity and 
depression—as well as the wide range and rich diversity of their several views. 
My entire argument, however, is hortatory:  the use of the label “Progressive” in both 
1948 and 2007 has in important measure been a cynical attempt to conceal an often 
unprogressive, illiberal platform.  As I will argue, partly on the basis of my own experience as a 
regulator, deregulator, and advisor on inflation to a liberal President, there is nothing either 
“progressive,” “liberal” or desirable about—successively—populist protectionism, xenophobia, 
competition-suppressing regulatory cartelization, repression of energy prices, recourse to price 
controls as a remedy or preventive of inflation or a rush to rein in or hamper the dynamic market 
processes of technological change—the major areas in which authentic liberals will continue to 
clash with latter-day “Progressives”.
 
I.  Open Market Principles of Liberals, Past and Present 
 
Eighteenth to 20
th century liberalism 
 
Liberals—and today’s principled conservatives—have historically advocated an open 
market—private, free enterprise, free trade—economy, with consumers best served by 
competition among producers and sellers, both internationally and domestically.  Late 19
th and 
early 20th century liberals and LaFollette Progressives, confronting the rise of big business and a 
massive national merger movement a century or so ago, were and continue to be consistent 
advocates of a vigorous antitrust policy, to preserve competition and protect competitors from  
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exclusionary practices by their more powerful rivals.  In contrast, conservatives, while rarely 
openly denying the need for antitrust laws in principle, have tended, except in instances of 
outright collusive price-fixing or market-sharing, to side with the defendants, decrying 
prosecutions of companies for engaging in unfair methods of competition as confusing the 
legitimate goal of preserving the competitive process with protecting competitors from deserved 
extinction.  
Increasingly sensitive to the imperfections of real world product, capital and labor 
markets, 19th and 20th century liberals, more and more in association with “institutionalist” 
skeptics of the “folklore of capitalism” and socialists, crypto- and overt—fought with increasing 
success for consumer protections such as pure food and drug and, later, consumer product safety 
and investor-protection laws, prohibitions of misleading advertising, comprehensive regulation 
of public utilities, conceived to be “naturally monopolistic”, and labor-protective and social 
security legislation, such as unemployment insurance, child labor, worker’s compensation, 
workplace safety, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, and protection of the right of 
workers to bargain collectively.  While most of those interventions may be conceived or 
rationalized as efforts merely to supplement or improve the functioning of essentially 
unregulated markets, others—supported, notably, by the industries themselves, as well as by 
above-mentioned “free-market” skeptics, curbed competition as “unethical” or “destructive”, as 
indeed it sometimes was.   
The remedy was often to subject practitioners to mandatory licensure, assertedly to 
ensure their competence, and imposing on them the obligation to serve all comers, without 
“undue” discrimination—an issue of enormous importance today in the form of legislative 
proposals to require Internet service providers to practice “network neutrality” (see Part IV, 
below), but also having the—often intentional—effect of restricting their number and prescribing 
higher-than-competitive prices.  In a series of epochal decisions over a half-century, the U.S. 
Supreme Courts struggled successively to decide whether this or that industry—grain elevators, 
employment and insurance agencies, theatre ticket brokers, local ice companies—was 
sufficiently “clothed with a public interest” to justify such regulation.  Along the way, in 1922, 
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, attempted a summary of the precedents to 
date (1923):  
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Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying some public 
regulation may be divided into three classes: 
  
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of 
privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative 
duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the public. 
Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.  
 
(2)  Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest 
attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived .... Such 
are those of the keepers of inns, cabs, and grist mills....  
 
(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be fairly 
said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to 
some government regulation .... In the language of the cases, the owner by 
devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an 
interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent 
of that interest. ...  
 
It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution, that the 
business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the 
mining operator, or the miner was clothed with such a public interest that 
the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by State regulation....  
 




Ultimately prevailing, however—insofar as the constitutionality of such legislative 
interventions was concerned—was the view enunciated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in one 
of his classic dissents: 
The notion that a business is clothed with the public interest and has been devoted 
to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is 
disagreeable to the sufferers.  The truth seems to me to be that, subject to 
compensation when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any 
business when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it.
2
 
                                                 
1Wolff Packing Company v. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 535-537 (1923).  
2Dissenting opinion in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927), and by Chief Justice Stone, likewise dissenting: 
  "The phrase 'business affected with a public interest' seems to me to be too vague and illusory to 
carry us very far on the way to a solution. It tends in use to become only a convenient expression for 
describing those businesses, regulation of which has been permitted in the past. To say that only 
those businesses affected with a public interest may be regulated is but another way of stating that 
all those businesses which may be regulated are affected with a public interest."  Ibid., p. 451.  
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And by his unequivocally liberal junior partner in dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis: 
 
The notion of a distinct category of business 'affected with a public interest,' 
employing property 'devoted to a public use,' rests upon historical error. . . . In my 
opinion, the true principle is that the State's power extends to every regulation of 




Sensitive also to increasing inequality in the distribution of income and opportunity, 19
th 
and 20
th century liberals have supported free public education and progressive income and 
inheritance taxation.  In this they have been joined by conscientious conservatives:  John Stuart 
Mill, apostle of classical economic liberalism, endorsed what the Bush Administration has been 
pleased to call the “death tax,” as a means of promoting the equality of opportunity that a free 
market economy was intended to offer, and that de Tocqueville praised as contributing to 
America’s “meritocracy”, and Clinton Rossiter—the eloquent expositor of a 20
th century version 
of  Conservatism in America to which 20
th century liberals could also readily subscribe—
identified as its final “shift in approach or emphasis”:  it 
 
has given some ground under the pressures of the age of anxiety and now admits 
that government can act positively in defense and elaboration of ‘the greatest of 
all rights—the right to equal opportunity.’
4
 
While radicals have frequently supported these liberal reforms, they have tended to 
regard them as superficial, at best palliatives, at worst “opiates for the masses”—delaying the 
                                                 
3   Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 301-303 (1932). 
4   Conservatism in America, 2
nd edition, revised, Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1982, 
pages 186-187.  The New York Times’ token but authentic conservative columnist, David Brooks, berated the 
Republican Presidential candidates for the fact that, in their economic debate in Michigan,  
 
there was almost nothing that touched concretely on the lives of the ambitious working-class 
parents who are the backbone of the G.O.P. 
  Sometimes the candidates seemed more concerned with massaging the pleasure buttons of the 
Club for Growth than addressing the real concerns of the middle class.  They talked far more about 
cutting corporate taxes, for example, than about a child tax credit for struggling families, [leaving to 
be] “seized by a Democrat [Hillary Clinton] programs aimed directly at members of the aspiring 
middle class 
Yesterday, it was a tax credit for college ….   The way our tax code is structured, people up the 
income ladder get big tax incentives to save, while working people, who have the most trouble saving, 
get the smallest incentives. 
 
“The Hamiltonian Ground,” October 12, 2007, p. A47.  See also Irwin M. Stelzer’s characteristically bold challenge 
to fellow conservatives, Inheritance Tax: From Grave to Cradle, Building a Meritocracy, London, Social Market 
Foundation, 2003.  
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ultimate triumph of socialism.  In a horrible but not unrepresentative example of this perverse 
reasoning, the Communists in Germany threw their support to the Nazi Party in the early 1930s, 
providing its margin of victory over the Social Democrats. 
More modest but equally enlightening examples of this kind of self-defeating political 
“realism” that I have witnessed were the decision of the incumbent, authentic Progressive 
Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette Jr. and his supporters to abandon their independence in 
1946 and attempt to take over the stronger State Republican organization; and of the state’s New 
Deal Democrats crossing over into the Republican senatorial primary to vote against the popular 
LaFollette, because they thought that his obscure opponent would be easier for their liberal 
candidate to defeat in the general election.  The opponent was a comparatively unknown state 
judge, Joseph McCarthy. 
 
Statutory cartelization:  the effect of the Great Depression of the 1930s 
 
The apparent victories of the latter-day liberals continued in spurts throughout the 20
th 
century, from Theodore Roosevelt’s successes in conservation and—almost certainly 
undeservedly
5—trust-busting:  recall his attacks on the “malefactors of great wealth”—Woodrow 
Wilson’s New Freedom, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, and the Fair Deal, New Frontier and 
Great Society programs of Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. 
Some of the “reforms” were less progressive than their proponents thought.  Regulation 
of the railroads, it became increasingly clear, was promoted as much by the railroads themselves, 
to suppress competition among them, as by farmers captive to a single transporter of their crops.  
Similarly, the telephone and electric companies accepted—indeed, promoted—cost-plus 
regulation by state public utility commissions—often manned by pliable failed politicians—as a 
small price to pay for the franchises that gave them legal protection from competition. 
And the several industry-wide trade associations that sprang up in the 1920’s, with the 
encouragement of Secretary of Commerce  Herbert Hoover, and supported plausibly by the 
conception that competition itself might be improved and important benefits might flow from 
collaborations among all industry members—for example, in gathering information, conducting 
                                                 
5    See the bitter criticisms of him in (the first) Robert M. LaFollette, A Personal Narrative of Political 
Experiences, Madison, Wisconsin:  the Robert M. LaFollette Co., 1911, Chapter XIII, “Why I Continued as a 
Candidate; Roosevelt Never a Progressive….”   
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research, promoting sales—inevitably also periodically invoked charges by the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice that they were in individual cases also suppressing 
competition—confirming Adam Smith famous warning in his Wealth of Nations that “People of 
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”  And from the 
perspective of the Left, Robert A. Brady characterized “Business Self-Regimentation”as “the 
American Way” of Business as a System of Power, (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1943). 
The Great Depression of the 1930’s understandably reinforced those trends and caused 
other widespread desertions of liberals from the competitive free-market ideal.  Some of them 
acquiesced to the Republican-led highly protectionist Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930, a major 
propellant of the mutually frustrating downward spiral of international trade world wide—in the 
face of determined opposition, be it noted, of a group of mid-west “Progressives”, including the 
elder Senator LaFollette (following the eloquent lead of William Jennings Bryan a half-century 
earlier). Even more ominously, the 1933 National Recovery Act imposed a comprehensive 
cartelization on the entire domestic economy under codes of “fair competition,” drafted, industry 
by industry, by business and labor leaders—often (or typically) employing the trade association 
structure of the 1920’s—setting prices and imposing output quotas, company by company, in the 
erroneous belief that since competition had intensified the vicious downward wage/price spiral, 
the remedy was to suppress it.  President Reagan was not confusing a movie plot with historical 
reality in this case when he likened those “reforms” to the syndicalization of industry in Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany. 
 
Partial resurrection of liberalism in the later New Deal 
 
After the Supreme Court declared the N.R.A. unconstitutional, in 1935, the New Deal 
turned back to authentic liberalism in two important ways that remain thoroughly valid today.  
The first was its revival of antitrust enforcement under the vigorous leadership of Thurman 
Arnold—spurred also by the disclosures of a vast network of international cartels involving such 
companies as Standard Oil of New Jersey, DuPont, the German IG Farben and British Imperial 
Chemical Industries.  And, second, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State in the Roosevelt  
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Administration, chipped away at the Smoot-Hawley barriers by negotiating a series of trade 
agreements extending most-favored-nation treatment, reciprocally, to the exports of its 
signatories.  The logical successor efforts were our joining the World Trade Organization in 
1995, President Clinton’s successful promotion of the North-American Free Trade agreements 
(NAFTA), and his request of Congress—repeated by his Republican successor and still 
pending—for fast-track authority to negotiate others. 
 
II.  Enter the Latter-Day “Progressives”:  International Economic Policy 
 
Free trade, protectionism, and globalization 
 
Judging from the pages of The Nation—with its drum-beat criticisms of these trade 
liberalization initiatives—this is the first area in which the economic policies of today’s 
“Progressives,” mouthing Marxist or populist rhetoric, depart dramatically from the bipartisan 
liberal tradition.  A fair sample is their consistent criticism of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, and the now pending Central American counterpart (CAFTA), as supported by 
“corporate-friendly free-trade arguments,” for having “allowed global corporations to move 
production and capital around the world with no thought to the human and environmental 
consequences”
6—a “policy that has benefited multi-national corporations while driving down the 
standard of living for workers here and abroad”! [the italics and exclamation point are mine].
7
That the flight from liberal international trade policy has moved far beyond the pages of 
The Nation is amply affected by the news on January 2
nd of the new year, 2008, that all three 
leading Democratic presidential candidates—prominently including Hilary Clinton—had felt it 
necessary over the preceding week to proclaim their intention to “look into changing” the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, one of the proud liberal accomplishments of her 
husband’s Presidency.
8
Principled liberals, in contrast, accept the classical logic to the effect that free trade and 
free international flow of investment capital benefit all trading partners—the wealthier ones in 
                                                 
6   Eric Alterman, “Dude!  Where’s My Debate?”, The Nation, February 26, 2007, page 10. 
7    Andrea Batista Schlesinger, “Pro-Immigrant Populism,” The Nation, March 5, 2007, page 5.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, this solicitude for the interests of American labor is accompanied with a laudably liberal attitude 
toward immigration. 





expanded markets for their—typically higher-tech—products and lower-priced imports of raw 
materials and consumer products.  And, in recognition of the costs that displaced workers bear in 
consequence of those benefits to consumers at large, they advocate generous and extended 
transitional assistance to workers displaced by imports, including carryover of employer-
provided medical and retirement benefits. 
This unoriginal resolution, standing alone, is more than a trifle glib, passing over a great 
deal of deprivation and suffering on the part of the displaced workers and their families, the 
mitigation of which requires a correspondingly determined, creative social effort; but mere 
protectionism entails a greater, though less visible, cumulative exploitation of both foreign 
workers and domestic consumers.  The prescribed carryover of employee benefits, one important 
part of the transitional assistance, would correct what those of us with the longest memories will 
still regard as an original error, although probably politically expedient:  the financing of Social 
Security (and, later, medical) benefits by taxes on payrolls, rather than by graduated income and 
inheritance taxes, as the more radical self-styled authentically Progressive members of Congress 
attempted to do at the time.  In determined—and almost certainly politically shrewd—opposition 
to having social security regarded as a “dole”, President Roosevelt insisted that it take the form 
of insurance, financed by taxes on the beneficiaries and their employers’ payrolls.  Minnesota 
Senator Ernest Lundeen—one of that same group—introduced a bill that would have financed 
those benefits instead from general revenues, and particularly progressive income taxes (for the 
last of which many latter-day liberals would perhaps substitute a similarly graduated tax on 
consumption expenditures).  The anomaly—I should think liberals and “progressives” alike 
would think it anomalous—that the richness of the medical and retirements benefits enjoyed by 
families depends so heavily on the ability of workers to earn and employers to continue to pay—
was further accentuated by the exemption of employee fringe benefits from the wage and price 
controls during World War II.  It should also be a matter of more than historical interest that 
economists Milton Friedman and James Tobin, prominent exemplars, respectively, of 18
th and 
20
th century liberalism, both in effect endorsed the alternative, authentically progressive position 
when they both advocated graduated negative income taxes as the superior remedy for poverty—
proposals that turned up in the exemplary earned income tax credit enacted under President 
Clinton.   
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Louis Uchitelle, often a critic of free markets, cites the inspiring example of Denmark, 
where “[e]mployers … are relatively free to lay off workers, but the state then steps in with 
benefits that replace 70 percent of the lost income for four years.”  Their government also 
finances retraining and education, pressuring the unemployed to participate and then insisting 
that they accept reasonable job offers or risk cuts in their benefits.  The Danish government, he 
says, devotes three percent of the nation’s gross domestic product to retraining compared to less 
than one percent in the United States.  And, of course, everywhere in Europe the state pays for 
health insurance and for pensions that often encourage early retirement by replacing large 
percentages of preretirement income.
9
 
Agricultural subsidization and protectionism 
 
One area in which the two sides ought nevertheless to be able to agree would be our 
deplorable longstanding restrictions on imports and subsidized exports of agricultural 
commodities.  One example of especial poignancy today is our egregious quota restrictions on 
imports of sugar, which have held domestic prices far above world levels
10, to the benefit of one 
percent of the total farm population, many of them corporations and most of them with other 
good uses for their land. 
That deplorable program has taken on a wholly new dimension in recent years, as our 
dependence on foreign oil has grown, and with it the cost of subsidizing the energy-inefficient 
substitution of domestically produced ethanol from corn.  It is now common understanding that 
ethanol from sugar—that is, foreign sugar—would be far more economical and energy-efficient.  
We should not have been surprised, upon realization of that fact, to discover that some not very 
anonymous parties had long ago beaten all of us to the punch, with a 54 cents per gallon tariff on 
imported ethanol along with the federal subsidy of 51 cents for domestically-produced ethanol 
from corn.  (Evidently this outrageous protectionism is mitigated by an exemption from the tariff 
of ethanol produced in Caribbean and Central American countries from raw materials grown 
there; but, perhaps because of the indefensible 51¢ subsidy, imported ethanol accounted last year 
                                                 
9   “Job Securities Too, They Have a Happy Medium,” New York Times, February 25, 2007, Bus. Page 5. 
10   U.S. General Accounting Office, Supporting Sugar Prices Has Increased Users’ Costs While Benefiting the 
Producers, June 2000, estimated the cost to American consumers at $1.9 billion a year.  
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for only slightly more than ten percent of our total consumption.
11  An economist has no especial 
competence to predict whether recognition of this increasingly absurd reality and the perfect case 
it makes for the Bush Administration’s Caribbean Free Trade initiative will suffice to overcome 
the opposing political reality—symbolized by the continued scheduling of the first Presidential 
primary in Iowa.  More powerful than the sheer economic merits, we can only hope, will be such 
forces as the interest of American exporters in freer access to these markets, our geopolitical 
interest in the region, such less visible effects as the $1 or so increase in the retail price of a 
gallon of milk here in recent months, which in part reflects the sharply increased cost of animal 
feed, and the similar complaints of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, the National 
Chicken Council and National Turkey Federation (all presumably more influential here than the 
riot-provoking trebling of the price of tortillas in Mexico
12)—some of them explicitly demanding 
a ban on government subsidies for corn-based ethanol and lifting of the duty on the foreign 
product.
13
A Liberal is an internationalist, a protagonist of globalization, solicitous of the interests 
of foreign as well as domestic workers.  He takes satisfaction from the rapid economic 
development of South, South-East and East Asia over the last half century, taking advantage of 
their lower labor costs and assisted by Western capital and technology—just as foreign capital 
contributed powerfully to our own economic development in the 19
th century.  And he 
recognizes that begger-my-neighbor protectionism is a negative zero-sum game that neighbors 
can play as well as we. 
 
 
                                                 
11   “US and Brazil Seek to Promote Ethanol in Hemisphere”, New York Times, March 3, 2007, page A1 and C9.  
See also, more generally, Amani Elobeid and Simla Tokgoz, “Removal of U.S. Ethanol Domestic and Trade 
Distortions: Impact on U.S. and Brazilian Ethanol Markets”, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, 
Iowa State University, Working Paper 06-WP 427, October 2006. 
 
12   Ray Northstine, “The unintended consequences of the ethanol quick fix”, reprinted from The Christian Science 
Monitor in The Ithaca Journal, August 13, 2007, p. 7A.  In further demonstration of the proposition that 
everything is related to everything else, or “what goes around comes around,” Northstine reports the warning of 
religious leaders in Brazil “that a rapid increase in ethanol production based on sugar cane could lead to 
widespread deforestation, massive relocation of workers and their communities, and harsh working conditions 
for cane cutters”—strongly supporting the proposition that the real need is for more conservation on the demand 
side. 
13   Colin A. Carter, Henry I Miller, “Drunk on Ethanol”, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Policy Matters, 07-18, May 
2007, and Robert A. Hahn and Caroline Cecot, “The Benefits and Costs of Ethanol”, AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 07-17, November 2007.  
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Balance of trade deficits 
  At least one contention of the latter-day protectionists, implying that we are in a better 
position to play that game—more effectively and with more justification—than our trading 
partners because we buy more goods and services from them than they buy from us, is ignorant:  
I recently heard the host of my local “progressive” radio talk show declare, in a tone that would 
brook no contradiction (or, characteristically, telephoned interruption—have any of you listened 
to their smug cacklings?) that our huge, ominous balance of payments deficits have been caused 
by the modestly liberalizing trade agreements negotiated in the last two decades.  The assertion is 
flatly wrong:  the trade deficits have been the simple reflection of our total national spending 
exceeding our domestic income and production, the difference necessarily financed by increases 
in debt—domestically by the horrendous federal government deficits and consumer (including 
mortgage) debt, and internationally by the foreign accumulations of dollars and other dollar-
dominated assets.  If it had not been financed in this way by foreigners, this excess of our 
aggregate government, business and consumer spending over our own production would have 
been showing up instead in accelerating inflation.  All of that—simple arithmetic—has nothing 
to do with whether limitations on our imports are or have been high and rising or low and 
declining. 
The same arithmetic applies as foreigners have, in recent months, been increasingly 
reluctant to accumulate those overvalued dollars, in consequence of which the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar has plummeted—as much as fifty percent relative to the Euro and the 
Canadian dollar.  The diminished foreign exchange value of the dollar has, in turn, increased the 
prices of our imports—resulting in fewer bargains in Wal-Mart—and making our exports more 
and more attractive to foreigners.  The cheaper dollar has also encouraged a sharp increase in 
foreigners investing here—taking over the ownership of existing American companies and 
setting up new ones—in both cases preserving jobs that would otherwise have been lost and 
creating new ones—all of this welcome, but causing the Times’ formidable Maureen Dowd to 
ask “Who is going to own the American economy?”
14
The process has nothing to do with NAFTA, nothing to do with our having joined the 
World Trade Organization, nothing to do with whether we have the wisdom to eliminate our 
                                                 
14   “Red, White And Blue Tag Sale”, New York Times, January 20, 2008, Week in Review, p. 12.  
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stupid 54 cent tariff on imported ethanol or the 51 cent subsidy for ethanol produced 
domestically from corn. 
Foreigners are taking over American property and companies because we have been 
fighting a war in Iraq, financing it by government borrowing, because we have cut taxes on the 
wealthy, making it possible for them to build palaces in which to live. 
 And the fact that we buy more goods and services from foreigners than we sell to them 
carries no implication whatever that we could better sustain a war of import restrictions than 
their trading partners. 
 
Labor protective conditions 
 
There is one argument of the protectionists, however, that a conscientious liberal has to 
take seriously, all the while recognizing that it is typically a pretext for protectionism.  A century 
or so ago we supported laws limiting child labor, prescribing minimum wages and conditions in 
the workplace, and protecting the right of workers to bargain collectively—even though they 
tended to shelter labor in our wealthier states from competition from the less advanced.  Passage 
of national—as distinguished from state or local—environmental protection laws has had the 
same, altogether legitimate, consequence.  It is difficult therefore to disagree in principle with the 
efforts of self-proclaimed progressives to attach such conditions to our imports from low-income 
countries, even though their motives are protectionist.  The conscientious liberal must, however, 
insist on an equal sensitivity on our part to the fact that the attachment of such conditions to our 
purchases from low-income countries can deny their workers opportunities to improve their 
lives:  the “equalization” of wages, working conditions and environmental protections here and 
abroad, or, for that matter, flat prohibitions of child labor,
15 cannot be a legitimate pre-condition 
of trade—although that tendency may be its beneficial result.  The reported agreement between 
the Bush Administration and Democratic leaders of Congress to attach environmental and 
worker protections to several pending trade agreements
16 is therefore heartening—but only to the 
                                                 
15   Marc Lacey, “Bush to Press Free Trade in a Place Where Young Children Still Cut the Cane,” The New York 
Times, March 12, 2007, page A10 (referring to the Administration’s laudable initiative to encourage the 
production of ethanol from sugar). 
 
16   Steven R. Weisman, “Bush in Accord with Democrats on Trade Deals,” The New York Times, May 11, 2007, 
page 1F.  
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extent the “protections” are genuinely beneficial to the foreign nationals rather than merely 
protective of ours. 
Here again, the victories of three-quarters of a century ago at home point the way to the 
liberal enforcement of that proviso internationally:  The pertinent labor-protective laws in the 
United States were applied and enforced by the Federal government, not the individual states, 
where they could easily have become agents of protectionism.  That was the genius of our 
constitutional prohibition of states interfering with interstate commerce.  So, today—doubtless 
frustrating the intentions of latter-day “progressives”—any such labor-protective conditions 
would have to be established and enforced bilaterally or, preferably, multilaterally, by the 
International Labour Organization of the U.N. or World Trade Organization—not unilaterally by 
us. 
 
Quotas on Japanese cars 
 
Though not a fundamental cause of the economy-wide inflations of the 1970s, the 
behavior of our oligopolistic, strongly unionized automobile and steel industries, with their own 
private wage/price spirals and each with its own particular technological and competitive 
backwardness, aggravated nationwide stagflation.  Unsurprisingly, both successfully exerted 
powerful political pressure to stem the flow of imports that was a competitive economy’s 
retribution for their failures. 
The automobile industry posed a particularly poignant dilemma for liberals.  Battered by 
the inflow of German and Japanese cars that was the richly deserved competitive retribution for 
its poor record of durability, fuel economy and costly, frequent superficial changing of models, it 
mounted an intense campaign in the late ‘70s for the imposition of import quotas.  By liberal 
standards, however, the UAW was a “good,” progressive industrial union; and the industry was 
an Equal Rights employer, providing good jobs to comparatively unskilled minority workers 
emigrating from Southern farms.  Still it was shocking to discover that their demand for quotas 
was supported by the Consumer (sic) Federation of America. 
I do not recall President Carter ever receiving the acknowledgement he deserved for his 
courage in resisting those pressures.  Confronted with evidence that the Japanese and German 
cars averaged slightly more than one major repair in their first year of operation, while the most  
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popular American cars fell in the three- to four-times-a-year range, the President refused to 
support the demand for quotas, even though he was well aware of how badly he needed the 
support of the UAW in the impending Presidential primary and election campaigns.  For the 
record, it was the subsequent Reagan Administration, under pressure from a compliant Congress, 
that capitulated and imposed the quotas. 
 
 
III.  Domestic Policy:  Recartelization in the 1930’s, Decartelization in the ‘70’s and 
“Progressive” Recidivism in the ’90’s and ‘00’s 
 
Regulatory cartelization 
The will to cartelize from the Great Depression onward was not entirely vanquished by 
the Supreme Court’s interment of the NRA.  On the theory that trucking and air transportation 
were especially prone to “destructive competition” and under pressure from the industries 
themselves and their unions, comprehensive regulatory cartelization was imposed on them in 
1935 and in 1938, respectively.  Under those regimes, the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
Civil Aeronautics Board imposed highly restrictive licensure of entry—by type of cargo and 
routing—and strictly enforced prohibition of price competition, overt or covert, direct or indirect.  
My first General Counsel at the Civil Aeronautics Board advised us, for example, that we had no 
choice but to disallow United Airlines’ clever promotional fare on some winter flights to 
Denver—refundable if there were insufficient fresh snow for skiing—because it would have 
committed the sin of departing from its filed tariff.  Unsurprisingly, among the strongest—and 
only—supporters of airline and trucking regulation were the airlines themselves and their unions, 
and in the case of trucking, not only the American Trucking Association and Teamsters, but also 
the railroads, eager to stem the competitive incursions of the truckers.  Equally illuminating, the 
farm lobbies exercised their formidable political power to exempt the carriage of agricultural 
commodities from the “protections” of the new regulatory regime, leaving farmers free to 
provide their own carriage or invoke or take advantage of price-cutting competition among 






Wage and price controls 
Just as the regulatory cartelizations of the 1930s were a response to economy-wide 
deflation, so the deregulations of the late 1970s reflected the perception that the most serious 
threat to the economy was a chronic tendency to inflation.  That the inflation was in fact 
essentially a monetary or macroeconomic phenomenon, fueled by the military appropriations of 
the Cold War and the upsurge of debt-financed consumer spending, became undeniable after the 
failures of wage and price controls, mandatory under President Nixon, hortatory under Presidents 
Ford and Carter.  Predictably, it ultimately took a determined application of the monetary brakes 
by the Federal Reserve in all three cases—the third and most severe, be it noted, under the 
leadership of Paul Volcker, appointed to the Chairmanship by President Carter—to bring 
inflation under control, at the (likewise predicted) cost of a severe recession. 
The effort of liberals to avoid that outcome—while remembering also the distortions 
produced by President Nixon’s mandatory wage and price controls—by pursuing the path of 
essentially voluntary restraints, produced yet another dilemma—no doubt amusing to some 
Olympian observer.  It was epitomized by an uneasy meeting that I had with Frank Fitzsimmons, 
the powerful boss of the Teamster’s Union, in which, speaking on behalf of a President he 
probably held in contempt, I tried to persuade him to comply with our wage guidelines—fully 
recognizing that the only effective recompense I could offer was the one neither the President 
nor I was willing to consider:  a promise to relent in our efforts to deregulate trucking.  In that 
sense, we clearly had the last laugh—at the predictable price, however, of having eventually to 
leave the control of inflation to Chairman Volcker. 
That last historical experience itself reflected another evolution of the liberal tradition.  
The Progressive movement was agrarian in its origins—following the Granger, Greenback and 
Populist movements of the 1870s-90s—and hostile to Eastern financial interests and tight 
monetary policies:  recall William Jennings Bryan’s long-time advocacy of “free [monetization 
of] silver” and denunciation of the “Cross of Gold” in his Presidential nomination acceptance 
speech in 1896.  So they, along with twentieth century liberals—such as prominently, John 
Kenneth Galbraith (and I, before my searing experience of attempting to enforce voluntary price 
standards)—were apt to call for wage and price controls as an alternative to more stringent 
monetary policy as the preferable method of combating inflation.  I have learned that lesson 
(while also not forgetting that the French designers of the Maginot Line in the period between  
17
 
the First and Second World Wars likewise thought they had learned the lesson of the First).  And 
so, liberals such as I have over the last twenty years came generally to accept or even, 
grudgingly, praise Alan Greenspan’s exercise of monetary restraint, picking up the Volcker 
mantle, to prevent a resurgence of inflation in the next quarter-century.  In opposition, William 
Greider,  The Nation’s “progressive” resident Fed basher, has dismissed these comparatively 
successful policies as products of the last “20-25 years of rightwing governments [that have] 
suppressed working-class wages.”
17  Indeed they have—at least so far as money wages are 
concerned—but they have also stopped self-defeating wage/price spirals. 
None of this is to deny our proper dismay at the virtual stagnation of real wages in recent 
decades.  It is to say only that the solution is not to be found in price controls or government 
suppressions of competition.  The latter do tend to shelter, indeed inflate wages in the cartelized 




The deregulations, concentrated in the period 1977-80, were the product of a coalition of 
20
th century liberals and conservatives, beginning in the Ford Administration, and carried to 
fruition under President Carter, with the active leadership of Senator Ted Kennedy (ably assisted 
by Professor—now Supreme Court Justice—Stephen Breyer) and support of such conservative 
Democrats as Senator Howard Cannon and liberal Republicans as Senator Bob Packwood.   
Leading non-governmental members of the coalition were The Consumer Federation of America, 
Common Cause, Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen—remember those organizations, in preparation 
for a “progressive” sequel—Southwest Airlines (which was eager to be permitted to bring its 
low-cost low-fare style of operation to the interstate arena) and the National Association of 
Manufacturers, presumably representing the interests of business travelers.  These groups were 
abetted, in the case of trucking, by the National Federation of Small Businesses, some very large 
industrial and mercantile shippers, and farm organizations, the last of these chafing at restrictive 
Interstate Commerce Commission interpretations of the original 1935 Act’s exemption of the 
carriage of agricultural commodities (should it, for example, include frozen chicken?)—another 
tip-off to whom that Act was really intended to protect.  Only such broadly based coalitions and 
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a determined President could have prevailed against the concerted opposition, respectively, of 




Despite the breadth of these coalitions, the left-wingers among the liberals—a prominent 
example of whom was the aforementioned Professor Galbraith—were never enthusiastic about 
the deregulations—just as they have been prone to underestimate the effectiveness of 
competition in the economy generally.  Afterwards, in coalition with the airline unions, some of 
the most ardent consumer organizations originally supportive of deregulation in the ‘70s decided 
it had all been a mistake: 
 
“Deregulation was supposed to cut prices, expand choice, enhance service—
improve your life.  So how come you’re not smiling?”
20   
 
A decade or so after deregulation, the Economic Policy Institute, evidently supported by 
organized labor, hired a law professor, Paul Dempsey, another long-time opponent, to point out 
triumphantly that while average fares had declined very satisfactorily in real terms after 
deregulation, they had declined no more rapidly than during the corresponding preceding 
period—conveniently overlooking the fact that, as I had myself suggested twenty years 
previously, the explanation in the earlier period was the deus ex machina of the jet revolution, 
whereas in the later period it was the furious competitive discounting made possible by the 
change in the law.  And the economist and co-founder of the Institute, Robert Kuttner, began his 
complaint about deregulation, “High cost of flying” (The Boston Globe, September 18, 1988): 
 
It costs $352.50 for a round-trip coach ticket between Boston and Washington, a 
distance of 406 air miles.  But if you want to go to London, 3,267 miles away, it 
costs as little as $298—provided you meet the restrictions.
21
 
Despite my response (in The Washington Post, September 25), that he had, unforgivably, chosen 
the highest of the first range of fares and the lowest of the second— 
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As for the $352.50 [for Boston/Washington], Eastern Airlines tells me that this 
July, the following percentages of its Boston/Washington passengers traveled at 
the following average round-trip fares, including tax:  30 percent at $325.03, 9 
percent at $280.46, 24 percent at $152.20 and 34 percent at $138.07. …  That 
produces a weighted average round-trip fare of $226.22…. 
 
The $298 Boston/London fare is even more so.  He seems to be referring to the 
fall excursion fare just announced by Pan American and TWA, which is available 
only with severe restrictions during this fall’s off-peak season ….  Eastern has 
supplied me with the other published round-trip fares between Boston and 
London … excursion fare, low season: $401; excursion fare, high season: $506; 
regular tourist fare: $1,587….
22
 
he committed the same offense some eighteen and a half years later:  
It costs me more to fly to Washington, D.C., than to Washington State, even 
though it's less than one-sixth the distance. 
23
 
  And once again, The Nation’s William Greider, characteristically permitting ideology to 
determine the facts: 
 
“The deregulated system raised costs for the least affluent, while larger business 
customers were able to bargain for lower prices.”
24
 
No one who has looked at the facts of the last 25 years can fail to see that, on the contrary, the 
most dramatic and immediate effect of airline deregulation was the explosion of discounting, 
cutting average fares by about one-half, inflation adjusted, and bringing air travel at once within 
the reach of people of modest incomes.  While large businesses also were enabled to bargain for 
bulk discounts, the most bitter complainers about the new fare structures were in fact the 
business travelers who, finding it inconvenient to qualify for the discounts—two weeks advance 
purchase, mandatory stay over the weekend and the like—had to pay something much closer to 
full fare.  The significant economic fact is that those discount fares, employed almost at once by 
the overwhelming majority of travelers, made possible, and, correspondingly, were made 
possible by the increase in the average percentage of seats sold—load factors—from the low 50s 
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in the decade before deregulation, with comfortable spacing of seats, into the very high 70’s and 
now low 80’s—for torsos only.  That release of price competition produced annual benefits to 
consumers that Clifford Winston and Stephen Morrison, the foremost academic students of this 
experience, have estimated at $20 billion a year. 
  And it did this without in any way interrupting the long-term decline in accident rates, 
ensured by continuing safety regulation and improvement in technology—confuting the dire 
predictions of opponents that the pressures of price competition unleashed by deregulation would 
force managements to skimp on safety.  (Similar predictions by the trucking companies and the 
Teamsters were likewise contradicted by experience, as well as by studies demonstrating the 
efficacy of increased random roadside inspections, checking drivers’ logs and equipment.) 
  Conveniently demonstrating the inexcusable recidivism of today’s self-styled 
Progressives has been the intense political battle set off by the Bush Administration’s move to 
fulfill our side of the bargain, in the North American Free Trade Agreement, to permit Mexican 
trucking companies to cross our national borders, accompanied by  the unexceptionable assertion 
of the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General’s Office that we need tighter control on 
Mexican truck and bus drivers with driving convictions and intensified inspections at the border. 
The opposition of the American teamsters is of course unsurprising.  Although not surprised, I 
found myself nevertheless outraged to read of the support of that protectionism by Ralph Nader’s 
Public Citizen, assertedly representing the “public interest.”
25
To be sure, the 25- to 30-point increase in airline load factors has meant increased 
crowding and discomfort, the intensity of which I have no intention to minimize.   But it was 
precisely the failure of the industry under regulation to provide travelers of modest means with a 
choice of economy over comfort that constituted both the need for deregulation and the essence 
of its success.  The airline experience wonderfully illustrates the principle that cartelization of a 
structurally competitive industry—in particular, the prohibition of price competition—sets off all 
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sorts of other forms of competition, substantive and non-substantive—the fatal flaw of which is 
that it denies customers the choice of low-priced service free of those amenities.
26
 
Bumping rules for airlines 
One such specific choice, for the offer of which I claim some credit, was the bumping 
rule that I persuaded the Civil Aeronautics Board to adopt shortly after assuming the 
Chairmanship.  As to the conception, I happily acknowledge the priority of the late Julian Simon, 
who had struggled in vain for many years to convince the airlines and the Board to install such a 
scheme—and sent me a bouquet of roses the day I fulfilled his mission—and that of other 
economists, such as the Nobel Laureate William Vickrey and, independently, my former 
colleagues Harold E. Bierman and Harold J. Thomas, who had also suggested specific quasi-
auction schemes).  For years, the Board had searched in vain for some ethical principle on the 
basis of which to decide who should have priority in retaining his seat and who should be 
                                                 
26   The airline experience clearly illustrates the principle that in an industry with a number of competitors, actual 
and/or potential, suppressions of price competition set off wasteful competition instead in quality of service, 
real and imaginary.  In a compromise between economy of effort and modesty, here is how I expressed the 
principle, first generally, in 1981: 
 
If price is prevented from falling to marginal cost … then, to the extent that competition prevails, it will 
tend to raise cost to the level of price. 
 
The Economics of Regulation, reprinted, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1988, Volume 2, p. 209. 
 
Then, more specifically, to an international aviation audience: 
 
The typical answer of foreign governments to asserted excessively low load factors, namely the 
imposition of direct limitations on the amount of capacity offered, market by market, provides yet another 
illustration of the inexorable tendency for regulation of a competitive industry to spread.  Control price, and 
the result will be an artificial stimulus to entry.  Control entry as well, and the result will be an artificial 
stimulus to compete by offering larger commissions to travel agents, advertising, denser scheduling, free 
meals, and bigger seats.  The response of the complete regulator, then, is to limit advertising, control 
scheduling and travel agents’ commissions, specify the size of the sandwiches and seats and the charge for 
in-flight movies.  Each time the dike springs a leak, plug it with one of your fingers; just as a dynamic 
industry will perpetually find ways of opening new holes in the dike, so an ingenious regulator will never 
run out of regulatory fingers. 
The economically efficient way of deciding how much higher-cost service should be provided is to give 
customers a choice between it and lower price/quality combinations. … 
And price competition does so much more.  It puts severe pressure on managements, which regulation 
can never duplicate, to improve the efficiency with which they operate, and to hold down the prices they 
pay for labor and other inputs.  And, in contrast with capacity controls, it provides the maximum assurance 
that the cost savings will, in fact, be passed on to the traveling and shipping public.  
  
Presentation before a symposium, “The Changing Environment of International Air Commerce,” Georgetown 
University, Washington, D.C., May 4, 1978; reproduced in Air Law (Netherlands), Volume 3, No. 3, 1978.  
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selected to surrender it in the event the number of travelers with confirmed reservations turning 
up for a flight exceeded the capacity of the aircraft. 
At the first opportunity, I proposed the simple resolution of what I pointed out was an 
economic rather than an ethical or moral problem: 
it seems to me the April 25 staff memo before me fails to focus clearly on the 
significance of the central point I heard Judge [Lee] West make at the last Board 
meeting on this subject:  namely, that the cost of a denial of boarding will vary 
enormously depending on the circumstances of the particular traveler who is 
bumped. 
 
This suggests to me that the essential job before us is to see to it that the ones who 
are bumped are the ones whose pain is least, relative to the compensation they 
receive.  Indeed, the ideal result would be one in which all non-boardings in the 
event of overbooking are voluntary, i.e., the “bumpees” get off, or don’t get on, 
because the compensation is sufficient to make it worthwhile.  If we could 
achieve that end, there would be no objections to boarding denials—a result 
certainly worth a dedicated effort to achieve.
27
 
And, then, at the next opportunity: 
 
I’d like to suggest the following possible plan for dealing with the overbooking 
problem. 
 
That the Board issue a proposed rulemaking, the central feature of which would 
be a declaration of intention to prohibit all involuntary bumping.  (If you read my 
memo of June 22 on this subject, you will recognize that this is not necessarily a 
prohibition of overbooking, but requires only that the people who are bumped 




—from which followed the common—perhaps universal—practice of airlines offering 
compensation in the form of free flights on some other occasion, sufficient to elicit the requisite 
number of volunteers to surrender their seats on the flight that turned out to have been over-
overbooked. 
Some Board members and “progressive” consumer advocates—such as (once again!) 
Ralph Nader’s Aviation Consumer Action Project, whose leader had, in a notorious incident, 
been the victim of one such denial of boarding—contended that deliberate overbooking was 
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28   Memorandum to Board Members: “Overbooking, a Specific Proposal”, July 20, 1977.  
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immoral and our solution equally so because it would be the poorer people who would typically 
give up their seats; and that the regular airline practice of overbooking, in recognition of the 
probability that not all holders of reservations would typically claim their seats, should be subject 
to severe penalties when—inevitably, under the laws of probability—it resulted in carriers 
overestimating the number of no-shows and being forced in consequence to deny some 
passengers their right to a seat.  What I succeeded in persuading my colleagues—none of them, 
of course, economists, until I was joined, happily, by Elizabeth Bailey—was that the practice 
itself had nothing to do with morality, but was efficient:  that permitting planes to fly out with 
empty seats was pure waste; and that overbooking in order to minimize the likelihood of that 
eventuality would be economically efficient so long as the benefit to the carrier could be made to 
exceed the cost—the inconvenience to travelers volunteering to surrender their reserved seats on 
those occasions when the overbooking turned out to have been excessive.  The obvious solution, 
which we adopted, was the rule that on those occasions in which the number of travelers with 
reservations appearing at the ticket counter exceeded the number of available seats, the airline 
would be required to offer all its passengers the option of compensation—typically, as it turned 
out, a future free round-trip ticket anywhere on the carrier’s domestic system—sufficient to 
induce the required number of them to surrender their seats voluntarily.  From the standpoint of 
both the carrier and society at large, the practice would be efficient so long as the net additional 
revenues of the carrier attributable to its overbookings exceeded the compensation required to 
induce the requisite number of volunteers to surrender their seats when necessary.  Conversely, 
so long as the compensation offered was sufficient to elicit the requisite number of volunteers 
and, on the other hand, less than the net additional revenue from filling seats that would 
otherwise go out empty, no party would be a loser, neither the airline nor the volunteers.  If the 
costs of the necessary bribes, instead, turned out to exceed the additional net revenue earned by 
its overbooking, it would be the carrier itself that would bear the cost of its mistake—a healthy 
discipline against over-over-overbooking.  And, most important, such a rule should have 
appeased—although it did not, universally—the “consumer advocates” who objected that the 
burden of denied boarding would under this arrangement always fall on the “poor”:  no party, 
rich or poor, would give up his seat so long as the anticipated  inconvenience of having to wait 
for the next flight exceeded the value of the compensation; and while, conversely, it would 
indeed typically be the less affluent who would accept such bribes, they would still do so only  
24
 
voluntarily—that is only if, as a result of doing so, they would come out winners.  A perfect 
example of a no-loss no-loser arrangement. 
 
Congestion and congestion pricing 
 
Since I freely admit—indeed, proudly claim—some responsibility for the increased 
crowding and discomfort and, in particular, the increased congestion in the skies and on the 
ground and consequent delays (the worst in the first half 2007 since the DOT began keeping 
track in 1995
29)—even far beyond the ones that the airlines have already implicitly 
acknowledged by increasing their scheduled flight and arrival times—I feel entitled to point out 
that they were easily foreseeable and the preventive identified and urgently advocated—by me 
early in the deregulation process
30 and, before that and before he became my cohort in 
deregulation, Michael E. Levine
31:  charging more efficiently for airport and air traffic control 
services.  This means, above all, the adoption of time-of-day and location-varying congestion 
pricing—following the identical, unexceptionable principles I induced my colleagues at the New 
York Public Service Commission to apply to the pricing of public utility services thirty years 
ago
32, and New York City Mayor Bloomberg, today, following the lead of London and 
Singapore, wants to apply to automobiles entering downtown Manhattan. (Incidentally, it would 
also have substantially mitigated the explosion in the price of electricity in California when it 
deregulated wholesale prices without explicitly requiring generators and/or retailers to maintain a 
stipulated margin of reserve capacity.
33) 
Airport landing fees continue to be based largely on the weight of the aircraft, which may 
reasonably reflect wear and tear on the runway but totally ignores the far more important 
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respective contributions of scheduled flights to congestion at different times and places.   
Similarly, air traffic control services—provided by the Federal Aviation Administration—are 
financed by taxes on fuel and passenger tickets, neither of which reflects the same wide 
differences and fluctuations in congestion.  Both have the additional absurd consequence that 
light, private business aircraft with one or only a few passengers can, at minimum cost, 
contribute just as much to congestion as large commercial aircraft (actually more because of the 
wider spacing of flights that they require), with no penalty or charge reflecting the costs they 
impose on others.  That cost, incidentally, is not necessarily alleviated by their use of nearby 
airports:  Teterborough’s reliever airport for private aircraft, in northern New Jersey, uses the 
same airspace as Newark. Even more generally, as Dorothy Robyn, representing the Department 
of Transportation, graphically pointed out several years ago, this system of cost recovery or 
charging has inefficiently encouraged the substitution of smaller, regional jets for larger aircraft, 
vastly  increasing the burden of congestion in the sky and on the ground at peak hours.
34
No doubt unsurprisingly, but no less appalling, the Bush Administration has reacted to 
the present genuine crisis by calling upon executives of the airlines and officials of airports to 
submit recommendations involving  
schedule reductions, whether achieved by negotiations or by government order … 
[in time] to be effective by the peak summer travel season … Brian Turmail, a 
spokesman for the Transportation Department ….  said the … Department 
preferred a negotiated solution rather than a ‘blunt’ government order.
35
 
Doubtless reflecting equally tin ears on both sides of the legislative aisles for the evils of 
cartelization, a prominent Democratic Senator announced he too would be calling on the 
Transportation Department to convene a meeting of airlines to coordinate scheduled cuts ….”, a 
proposal easily predicted—by me—twenty-nine years previously:  
As I read through the list of topics and questions that were given to me by 
FAA as possible items to discuss, they all really seem to come down to one 
question, “Can you people at the CAB do more than you are doing to reduce those 
demands that you are placing upon us and the pressures that they are 
creating?”…. 
 
                                                 
34   Dorothy Robyn, “Remarks to International Aviation Club,” July 18, 2000. 
35   Matthew L. Wald, “Talks Sought for Airlines to Address Congestion, New York Times, October 11, 2007, 




The first part is no; I am not interested in helping you directly.  I am not 
interested in … controlling airline scheduling….  [or] authorizing the carriers to 
get together and collaboratively regulate their schedules or otherwise limit the 
capacity that they offer and, therefore, the pressures that they impose on airport 
[and air traffic control] facilities…. 
 
I am not interested in cooperating in any way in imposing hourly quotas 
and airport slotting.  These are all forms of direct rationing, and everybody here 
knows that direct rationing is extremely inefficient…. 
 
[A]t a time when we at the CAB are trying to restore economic rationality 
to this industry … to place increasing reliance on the competitive market … to 
decide how much airline service should be provided and where; at a time when 
we at the CAB are doing our best to lift the heavy burden of pervasive, direct, 
arbitrary, artificial bureaucratic interventions, we are not about to set about 
enthusiastically to intensify precisely those same kinds of arbitrary controls in 
order to solve the problem of limited airport [and air] space inefficiently…. 
 
There is no guarantee that freer competition on the airline side of the 
equation—that is the part that creates the demand for airports [and air traffic 
control]—alone will solve these problems.  On the contrary, it will stimulate more 
air travel…. 
 
The allocation of scarce airport [and air] space is an economic problem 
just like any other economic problem, and the decision about whether to incur the 
cost of additional capacity or the cost of expensive R&D or what kinds of R&D to 
develop new technologies … is an economic problem.  And it will never be made 
intelligently until the users who are responsible for the incurrence of those costs 
… pay the full cost reckoned on a marginal or replacement basis….  It would also 
encourage the use of big planes if you had the proper charging because their cost 
per passenger would be lower than the cost of small planes if they happened to 
coincide with the system peak. 
 
[M]y moral is simply this to the FAA:  If you are going to follow 
economically irrational policies, don’t ask the CAB to bail you out by doing the 
same thing:  As the gang in West Side Story said at the end:  “Officer Krupke, 
we’ve got problems of our own.”  If, however, you are willing to be thinking 




                                                 
36   “Route Awards and Airline Scheduling Practices”, Federal Aviation Conference, March 22, 
1978, italics supplied and with bracketed modifications reflecting my later recognition that 
the statement applied with equal force to air traffic control services.  
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The only possible—and sufficient—solution is to entrust  air traffic control to a separate, 
corporate entity, independent of Congress, empowered to raise the capital it needs to adopt the 
most modern technology—apparently employing global positioning—financing the investment 




Airline passenger “Bills of Rights” 
  The enormous increase in flying spurred by deregulation, the increased crowding and 
congestion on planes, in the airways and on the ground, and the intensified pressures on carriers 
to cut costs—these instruments and manifestations of the successes of deregulation—have also, 
understandably, been the occasion also for mounting complaints by travelers generally about 
mistreatments, both real and imagined.  Liberals and latter-day Progressives alike would 
recognize the need for governmental protection of consumers against deceptive or otherwise 
unfair treatment, inviting complaints of specific asserted mistreatments and empowered to 
provide redress—as, most recently, in New York State’s “Airline Passenger Rights” legislation, 
effective January 1, 2008, entrusting this responsibility to the State Consumer Protection Board.   
Statement of this unexceptionable principle provides little substantive guidance for the 
resolution of the most familiar complaints, about losses of baggage and cancellations of flights, 
the latter because of weather, asserted mechanical problems or shortages of crew.  There is an 
entire jurisprudence to be developed here, involving the optimal distribution of risk or cost 
between carriers and travelers—subject also of course to the demands of safety.    (My first 
inclination was to attach the adjective “overriding” or “absolute” to these last demands, only to 
recognize that total assurance is impossible if passengers board airplanes at all, and, even more 
so—if one can conceive of gradations of “impossibility”—if they travel by car instead.) 
  Apart from recognizing that there is a problem here, having little or nothing to do with 
economic merits of deregulation, I have no particular wisdom to impart about the proper 
distribution of burdens of these failures between carriers and travelers—a problem which 
                                                 
37   See Robert W. Poole, Jr.—a pioneer advocate—“The Urgent Need to Reform the FAA’s Air Traffic Control 
System,” The Reason Foundation, Executive Summary Backgrounder, No 2007, July 20, 2007; GAO Panel, 
“National Airspace System — Experts’ Views on Improving the U.S. Air Traffic Control Modernization 
Program”, April 2005; Steven A. Morrison and Clifford Winston, “Delayed!  U.S. Aviation Infrastructure 
Policy at a Crossroads,” in Clifford Winston and Gines de Rus, editors, Aviation Infrastructure Performance:  A 
Study of Comparative Political Economy, Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming 2008, estimating the 
colossal losses imposed by our present irrational system of providing infrastructure and charging for it.  
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Congress has been grappling with unsuccessfully for at least the past decade.  The possible 
encounter of weather unfit for flying is obviously an inherent part of the bundle of services 
covered by purchasing a confirmed reservation:  so long as the certification of that contingency 
is by an objective third-party, that is a cost that air travelers and carriers already assume—with 
no apparent reason for government regulation to change its distribution between them. 
In contrast, the costs to flyers of flight cancellations for mechanical reasons or lack of 
sufficient in-flight staff—or simple economy—would seem clearly the responsibility of the 
airlines themselves, and an equitable consumer protection program would presumably call for 
full compensation (however measured) to purchasers of tickets—which would also give the 
carriers the proper incentive to maintain the optimal balance between the costs of maintaining 
spare equipment and personnel sufficient to avoid such cancellations and the likely costs to them 




After their—one would hope—embarrassing support for quotas on Japanese cars, the 
other early premonitory defection of 20
th century “liberals”, first informally, then openly in 
Senator Kennedy’s campaign in 1980 for the Democratic presidential nomination, was over the 
issue of retention or abandonment of the price controls on crude oil and gasoline—previously 
imposed under the terms of the oil import quota system enacted in 1959.  In my role as 
administrator of the President’s ill-fated wage and price standards, I was visited by 
representatives of many of the consumer organizations that had previously supported our airline 
and trucking deregulations, in which Ralph Nader warned me that if President Carter removed 
those ceilings they would withdraw their support from the entire anti-inflation program.   
Recognizing that those controls, holding the domestic price of crude oil far below world levels, 
represented terrible energy policy, the President proceeded to set a schedule for deregulation—
another exhibition of courageous adherence to principle for which he never received the credit he 
deserved.  Even bolder was his subsequent invocation of his authority under that same Import 
Control Act to impose a ten-cents-a-gallon tax on gasoline—again, impeccable energy policy—
which promised the additional benefit of raising the $10 billion a year we needed to bring in a 
balanced budget for the next fiscal year. Although the President urgently invited the members of  
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the House and Senate to blame him, while letting the tax stand, Congress proceeded promptly to 
rescind it. 
 
IV.  “Network Neutrality”—The Unseemly Rush to Regulate 
And while the House of Peers withholds its legislative hand 
And noble statesmen do not itch to interfere in matters 
Which they do not understand 
So bright will shine Great Britain's rays 
As in King George's glorious days. 
Chorus: 
So bright will shine Great Britain's rays 
As in King George's glorious days. 
 
W. S. Gilbert, Iolanthe 
 
One of the most important current regulatory issues in which not only “Progressives” but 
also, alas, most of my fellow liberals seem to be on the regulatory or re-regulatory side, revolves 
around proposed legislation to require providers of high-speed Internet access to practice 




From the “commons”—no charge—to no “discriminatory” charge 
 
The concept of network neutrality evidently evolved out of a romantic (the 
characterization is descriptive, not derisive) vision of the Internet as a “commons,” open to all 
offerers of programs and content, free of charge, with guaranteed immediate access of any one 
broadband service subscriber to all others.  This vision has, anomalously, led some professed 
consumer activists to make the astounding proposal that the only charges be to the subscribers—
the ultimate consumers:   that originators or suppliers of Internet programs, content or service not 
be subject to additional charge at all for access to them
39.  That contention—obviously self-
                                                 
38   National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 543 U.S. 1185 (2005). 
39   See Mark C. Cooper, Director of Research of the Consumer [sic] Federation of America:  “Let the consumer 
pay—it is the consumer that uses the network”, and the critique by Larry Darby, Am. Consumer Inst., 
Consumer Welfare, Capital Formation and Net Neutrality 6 (2006), available at:  
http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/Net%20Neutrality%20Study.pdf; editorial, “Open Net,” The New 
Republic, June 26, 2006.  Sometimes one wonders who is supporting these several “consumer activists”!  
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interested on the part of such prominent suppliers of content and service as Google—ignores the 
fact that access to subscribers—the ultimate customers—is not only costly to provide (consider, 
for example, the multi-billion dollar investments of the telephone companies extending fiber to 
the premises, which will enable them to offer video in direct competition with the hitherto 
franchised-monopoly cable companies; and the similar huge investments in wireless
40)  but 
independently valuable to the content suppliers themselves as a potential source of advertising 
and other revenue: 
Google has become a powerhouse in advertising largely by selling short text 
advertising closely associated with topics people are researching or reading about 
on the Web.  But it is increasingly looking to place more elaborate advertisements 
that are more attractive to marketers promoting product brands.  Last year, it 
started allowing advertisers to bid to place advertisements using graphics and 
animation on sites it represents.
41
 
It is just as misguided for consumer advocates to want to forbid the telephone and cable 
companies that carry those messages charging advertisers for access to the public as it would be 
to impose a similar prohibition on newspapers, television broadcasters or cable companies, 
requiring them to obtain their revenues exclusively from readers, purchasers, subscribers or 
viewers:  think instead, for example, of who pays now for the annual broadcasts of Super Bowl 
games! 
It has made good economic sense, therefore, and been beneficial to both content suppliers 
and receivers to have had both of them together bear the heavy and continuously growing costs 
of connecting them:  the goal of an open, free “commons” has therefore given way to a demand 
that Internet access providers be required only to practice “network neutrality”. 
  It has not always been clear exactly what the supporters of that obligation have wanted.  
In general, their objection has been to the telephone and cable companies either charging at all, 
or “discriminating” in their charges among suppliers of content or programs and/or, specifically, 
“discriminating” on the basis of guaranteed priority in speed of delivery.  Such a practice, they 
                                                 
40   Marguerite Reardon, “Citywide Wi-Fi spending could hit $3 billion,” CNET News.com (October 25, 2006), 
available at http://m.news.com/Citywide+Wi-Fi+spending+could+hit+3+billion/2163-7351_3-6129655.html.  
Additionally, Sprint/Nextel announced a year or so ago that, in partnership with Intel, it would be spending $3 
billion in the next two to three years extending mobile Wi-Max service nationwide. 
 
41   Saul Hansell, “Google Moves to Sell Space for Video Spots on Network of Web Sites,” New York Times, May 
23, 2006, at C3.  
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express the fear, would be to the advantage of “deep-pocketed corporations” (whenever I hear 
that metaphor, I immediately reach for my own pocket, to make sure it is tightly buttoned) 
leaving all other content providers (the “little guys”) to “the digital equivalent of a winding dirt 
road”
42—a fair example of the populist rhetoric of leading advocates. 
The concern, however demagogically put, is not ridiculous.  The Internet is obviously 
something revolutionary, and there is room for something less than full confidence in the 
adequacy of competitive exploitation of its full potential under what is still essentially a 
telephone and cable company duopoly. The disagreement is in important measure therefore over 
the sufficiency of wireless access as a third option, particularly as the FCC opens more of the 
spectrum for that use, limiting the market power of the two dominating ubiquitous incumbent 
terrestrial systems.  To be sure, there are already many, many more subscribers now to wireless 
or cellular than to traditional land-line telephone service—subscriptions to the latter have 
dropped by 11 percent in just the last six years:  phone books are becoming palpably thinner.  
But while broadband wireless is likewise growing rapidly, to the point that it (including satellite) 
had as of the end of 2006 captured some 7.7 percent nationwide of what the FCC calls advanced 
services lines (over 200 kilobits per second in both directions)—I am frankly unable to judge 
whether that figure or the 27.8 percent and likewise rapidly increasing share of satellite and 
wireless in “higher speed lines over 200 kbps in at least one direction”
43 is the more relevant—
except for my understanding that the 200 kbs standard is today very slow service—the 
overwhelming majority of subscribers still confront a duopoly; and promised broadband over the 
ubiquitous electric power lines remains on the horizon. 
44, 
45
                                                 
42   Lawrence Lessig and Robert W. McChesney, “No Tolls on the Internet,” Washington Post, June 8, 2006, p. 
A23.   
 
43   Federal Communications Commission, “High-Speed Services for Internet Access:  Status as of December 31, 
2006,” FCC Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, October 2007, tables 1 
and 2.  The figures were 4.5 percent and 18.4 percent, respectively, only six months previously.  Ibid, 
corresponding report of January 2007. 
44   For a critique of the FCC’s optimistic assessments of the sufficiency of wireless as a competitive restraint on the 
landline duopoly providers of internet access, including the observation that the 200 kbps is “unrealistically 
low” (accompanied by an arguably contradictory argument for common carrier obligations of the—assertedly 
still only spottily available—franchised wireless carriers as well) see Rob Frieden, “Internet 3.0: Identifying 
Problems and Solutions to the Network Neutrality Debate”, 1 International Journal of Communications, pp. 
461, 479-480 (2007), available at: http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/160/86.  See, however, my own 
somewhat hesitant endorsement of common carriage obligations, partly under influence of Professor Frieden, 
text at notes 63-64, below. 
As to the aforementioned “arguably contradictory” contention, it seems to me that the justification Professor 
Frieden gives for imposing or retaining net neutrality requirements on the terrestrial carriers—namely, the  
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The revolutionary, inherently competitive potential of telecommunications technology, 
however, and the large, risky investments required to exploit it, argue strongly against subjecting 
Internet access to the thoroughgoing regulation traditionally applied to common carriers.
46  
Moreover, the blanket objection to “discrimination” among suppliers of programming or content 
on the basis of a guaranteed priority in speed of delivery is ignorant.  To an economist—and, one 
would hope, in ordinary parlance as well—“discrimination” is confined to differences in price, 
whether for the same service or for different services, that are not justified by differences in the 
cost of supplying them.  Manifestly, however, preferential guaranteed speed of delivery for 
particular messages can, when the network is congested, entail a delay, however slight, in the 
transmission of non-priority services:  that is a real cost.  And, in the longer-run, it involves the 
cost of providing additional broadband capacity sufficient to minimize—strictly “optimize”—
that negative effect. 
Differences in charges reflecting such differences in the cost of providing different 
qualities of service are the consequence not of monopoly but of an effectively functioning 
market.  The notion that it is “discriminatory” to charge users for services—such as voice 
telephone (VoIP), virtual teleconferencing, on-line gaming or downloading movies, the last a 
frighteningly growing demand—that use more bandwidth than others, for the guaranteed priority 
in delivery that they require for intelligibility or the additional investment that they invoke is 
ignorant.
47  So is the failure to recognize also the legitimacy of genuine price discrimination as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
asserted spottiness and insufficiency of their wireless competition—conflicts with his later proposal to impose 
on the wireless challengers the same obligation to permit attachment of “alien” devices or terminal equipment 
at the subscriber’s end as the 1968 Carterfone precedent applied to the local AT&T franchised monopolies.  See 
my discussion of the “alien attachments” issue in The Economics of Regulation, Vol. 2, pages 140-145. 
For a convincing marshalling of the evidence, however, that the rapid expansion of wireless and cable 
telephony as well as the effect of heavy sunk costs on the level of profit-maximizing prices (in an argument 
anticipated by J.M. Clark’s distinction between prices and “margin” elasticity of demand 47 years ago in his 
Competition as a Dynamic Process, Washington: Brookings, 1961, pp. 149-150, justifies deregulation of retail 
prices, see Timothy J. Tardiff, “Changes in industry structure and technological convergence: implications for 
competition policy and regulation in telecommunications”, International Economics and Economic Policy, 4:2, 
2007, pp. 109-133. 
45    See the thoroughly nuanced factual assessment by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, broadband 
connectivity competition policy June 2007, Chapter VI, culminating in “Suggested Guiding Principles” fully 
consonant with the policy conclusions I offer here. 
46    For persuasive warnings, see Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten, “The Economics of Net Neutrality”, AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 06-13, 2006, and Randolph J. May in a 
number of venues—the most recent, “The Threat to the Net from Net Neutering”, The Free State Foundation, 
January 8, 2008, citing an almost apocalyptic prediction of imminent congestion by The Economist. 
47   For a clear recognition of this by the more sophisticated advocates of network neutrality, see, among others, 
Frieden, op. cit., note 37 above.  For an incisive explication of the simple economic corollary that interference  
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means of recovering the heavy fixed and common costs of providing telecommunications 
services to a multiplicity of markets, provided it is not anti-competitive.
48
The proper agencies for administering that last proviso—which I intend emphatically to 
be the opposite of perfunctory—are the FCC and antitrust agencies, acting as enforcers of the 
antitrust laws and not as traditional regulatory agencies—prescribing rates and allowable rates of 
return overall:  that is my liberal conception of the lessons of history—lessons I spell out in 
greater detail and with greater emphasis in section V, following. 
In these circumstances, the remedy proposed by the network neutrality advocates is likely 
to be counter-productive.  The most powerful competition stems from technological 
innovation—the kind exemplified, preeminently, by telecommunications.  Comprehensive, 
compulsively tidy public utility-style regulation is not only unnecessary in such markets, it is an 
obstruction to developing competition among technologically different platforms:  The advocates 
of legislatively mandated network neutrality are proposing in effect to equalize the regulatory 
status of the competing telephone, cable and wireless companies by bringing the last two under 
the former’s public utility tent—the very opposite of what turbulent technological competition 
demands. 
The—or one—right direction is pointed out by a Statement on U.S. Broadband Policy, 
issued in March 2006 by 27 prominent economists,
49 and the several reports of the Digital Age 
Communications Act (DACA) Study Commission that was assembled by the Progress and 
Freedom Foundation (right-wing, to be sure, but in association with liberal advocates of 
competition and strong antitrust law enforcement). Both of them ask Congress to preempt and 
eliminate the thousands of local franchising regulations that restrict competitive entry of 
                                                                                                                                                             
with network pricing that reflects the differing technical demands of the several services—insisting, for 
example, that “packets corresponding to some real-time medical procedure between a doctor and a distant 
hospital (be) subject to the same delay and jitter as packets carrying Yahoo instant messages between bored 
high schools students in math class,” threatens massive welfare losses, see William E. Taylor, “Freedom, 
Regulation, and Net Neutrality”, NERA, September 12, 2007. 
48   Michael E. Levine, “Price Discrimination Without Market Power,” Yale Journal on Regulation 19:1, 2002, pp. 
1-36; William J. Baumol, “Regulation Misled by Misread Theory, Perfect Competition and Competition-
Imposed Price Discrimination,” AEI Press, March 2006.  For my own insistence that this recognition should not 
exonerate price discriminations that are predatory, see my “Telecommunications: The Transition from 
Regulation to Antitrust,” Journal on Telecommunications & High Technology Law, 5:1, 2007, pp. 165-175. 
49   Elizabeth E. Bailey et al., “Economists’ Statement on U.S. Broadband Policy”, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 06-06, March 2006, available at  http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1252;  see also Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, op. cit.; 
Thomas W. Hazlett, “Cable TV Franchises as Barriers to Video Competition”, George Mason University Law 




broadband access suppliers.  And in this network industry, in which the owner of any particular 
link in the interconnecting web of carriers can prevent messages or context initiating with any 
other carrier reaching all subscribers—the vision of the “commons”—the DACA Report adds, 
the antitrust or regulatory agencies should have the authority to require owners of all broadband 
links to interconnect with one another for the reciprocal transmission of messages or content, as 
they now routinely do.
50
In describing the danger that the telephone and cable companies will, as the preponderant 
suppliers of broadband access, discriminate against competitive providers of service or 
programming,
 51 every network neutrality advocate appears to have cited the case of the Madison 
River Telephone Company’s refusal to carry the messages of Vonage, the leading independent 
provider of voice telephone service over the Internet—VoIP.  Few of them mention the fact that 
the FCC promptly stepped in to prohibit that clear violation of antitrust principles, as did the 
Canadian Radio-television Regulatory Commission in the same situation.  Others have 
suggested, similarly, that cable companies might discriminate—genuinely discriminate—against 
streaming video applications, because such uses would compete against their own video 
offerings.  It is unthinkable, however, that in a deregulated regime agencies charged with 
antitrust responsibility would not similarly strike down—or not be explicitly instructed by any 
deregulation legislation to strike down—any such genuine discriminations by the franchised or 
hitherto franchised land-line telephone or cable companies against competing providers of 
content in favor of their own or of their affiliates.  Observe that this solution simply bypasses the 
increasingly complex and turgid controversies—largely in [University of] “Chicago” and “post-
Chicago” terms—about the likely frequency of such practices and their injuriousness to 
consumers. 
Following this principle, the consumer groups that have asked the FCC to stop Comcast’s 
admitted delaying of some traffic—specifically file sharing—assertedly (and plausibly) in order 
                                                 
50   Digital Age Communications Act, Proposal of the Regulatory Framework Working Group, The Progress and 
Freedom Foundation, June 2005, pages 24-29. 
51   See, for an excellent sampling, Brett M. Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, “Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo” (and the Yoo articles cited there), 
accepted for publication by Jurimetrics, the Journal of Law, Science and Technology, Vol. 47, Summer 2007—
supporting legislatively mandated neutrality—and, on the other side, Douglas A Hass, “The Never-Was-Neutral 
Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates”, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper 




“to keep a few file sharers from slowing down traffic for the majority of users,”
52 have filed their 
complaint with the competent agencies, properly empowered to determine whether, as they 
claim, the differential treatment of the two groups of customers was indeed discriminatory 
(rather than cost justified) and, if so, in some way anti-competitive.  As to the enforcement 
agencies and their mission, Professor Philip Weiser has them just right 
the debate (over network neutrality) is best addressed by the Federal 
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission….  (B)oth 
institutions are better positioned than Congress to reject the categorical calls for 
and against regulation and to recognize that the concerns that animate this debate 




V.  An Olive Branch to “Progressives”:  Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, 
Consumer Protection, and Preservation of an Obligation to Serve 
 
The conflicting conceptions of antitrust 
 
Having rejected the recidivism of the most strident “Progressives” (and many otherwise 
genuine liberals), I remind them that a vigorous and vigilant enforcement of antitrust and 
consumer protection laws has always been an essential part of the liberal program. 
That generalization fails in itself to confront the wide gulf that has emerged in antitrust 
literature and jurisprudence.   
On the one side are 20
th century liberals, such as I, who have for at least a half-century 
insisted that the proscriptions of antitrust apply specifically to anti-competitive behavior—
suppressions of competition by agreement, collusion, combination, or by actions of individual, 
dominant firms that deny rivals a fair opportunity to compete on the basis of their own efficiency 
and the attractiveness of their offerings.
54
As Hans B. Thorielli pointed out in his definitive The Federal Antitrust Policy, 
Origination of an American Tradition, this was clearly one distinct original intention of the 1890 
Sherman Act: 
                                                 
52   Staci D. Kramer, “Consumer Groups Ask F.C.C. to Halt Comcast’s File-Sharing Delays”, The New York Times, 
November 2, 2007.   
53    Philip J. Weiser, “The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality”, unpublished manuscript 2007. 
 
54   See my Fair Competition, the Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy, in collaboration with Joel B. Dirlam, 
Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1954.  
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The government’s natural role in the system of free private enterprise was that of 
a patrolman policing the highways of commerce.  It is the duty of the modern 
patrolman to keep the road open for all ... [T]his means that occupations were to 
be kept open to all who wished to try their luck … and that hindrances to equal 
opportunity were to be eliminated… 
 
There can be no doubt that the Congress felt that the ultimate beneficiary . . .  was 
the consumer….  The immediate beneficiary legislators had in mind, however, 
was in all probability the small business … whose opportunities were to be 
safeguarded from the dangers emanating from those recently-evolving elements 
of business…. strange, gigantic, ruthless and awe-inspiring. 
 
This is one reason why it was natural to adopt the old doctrines of the common 
law, doctrines whose meaning had been established largely in cases brought by 
business or professional people dissatisfied with the behavior of competitors. 
 
Perhaps we are even justified in saying that the Sherman Act is not to be viewed 
exclusively as an expression of economic policy.  In safeguarding rights of the 
‘common man’ in business ‘equal’ to those of the evolving more ‘ruthless’ . . .  




Any doubts on that score should have been put to rest by the passage in 1914 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act—one of the triumphs of the original, authentic Progressive 
movement—with its flat prohibition of “unfair methods of competition”—as before, actions, 
policies, or behavior restricting the competitive process.  Specifically, I suggest that the high 
termination fees evidently typically incorporated in cellular service contracts by the dominant 
providers
56 might well constitute unfair methods of competition or exclusionary practices under 
the Sherman and FTC Acts. 
The last half-century, in contrast, has witnessed the virtual triumph of an opposing, 
conservative view, inspired and powerfully rationalized by University of Chicago economists, 
highly sophisticated liberals of the eighteenth century variety, that the prohibitions of antitrust 
laws generally and of discrimination in particular should apply only upon clear demonstration of 
                                                 
55   The Federal Antitrust Policy, Origination of an American Tradition, John Hopkins Press,  Baltimore, MD 
(1955), pp. 226-227 (1955), referring only to the Sherman Act: 
 
56   See the eloquent protest of Randall Stross, “When Mobile Phones Aren’t Truly Mobile,” The New York Times, 
July 22, 2007, Business Section, p. 3.  
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a genuine threat of injury to consumers
57—the application of which has typically involved the 
courts in competing testimonies by economist-witnesses. 
This issue is clearly exposed by the carefully articulated proposal of the ambitious Digital 
Age Communications Act (DACA) Project, sponsored by the Progress and Freedom Foundation, 
in which I participated, and incorporated in the DeMint bill, introduced in the 109
th Congress, 1st 
Session, explicitly recommending application of the Section 5 FTC Act unfair methods of 
competition “model”—which accords completely with my own historical position.  The DACA 
proposal goes on, however, to recommend that the prohibition of discrimination or other 
practices denying rivals a fair opportunity to compete apply only to practices or behavior that 
demonstrably “pose a substantial and non-transitory risk to consumer welfare”—a clear victory 
for the University of Chicago, but also representing a consensus view of most respectable 
economists as well as the courts.
58
My own historical position—that antitrust proscriptions of unfair methods of competition 
should apply to all genuine discriminations by franchised wireline and wireless telephone and 
cable companies in favor of affiliated content providers, to the disadvantage of unaffiliated 
ones—is the main olive branch I offer to advocates of network neutrality legislation. 
To return to the present flood of highly emotional demands on Congress to enact such a 
requirement, by all means let there be congressional hearings, and administrative agencies 
explicitly instructed to subject claims of “discrimination” to critical scrutiny.  There is nothing 
liberal or progressive, however, about the government rushing in to regulate the wonderfully 
promising, turbulent, technology-based competitive developments in telecommunications.   
Whatever the professed disillusionment of “progressives” with the results of the economic 
deregulations to date (by which, of course,  I emphatically do not refer to the deliberate and 
systematic disembowelment of health, safety, environmental and investor protection laws and 
agencies by the present Bush administration), liberals of eighteenth through the twenty-first 
century varieties and authentic progressives as well will put their trust in competition, reinforced 
by explicit, legislatively-demanded application of traditional antitrust and consumer-protective 
                                                 
57   For a lucid, approving summary, see George A. Hay, “The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Antitrust Law”, Cornell 
Law School research paper No. 07-023. 
58   For an explicit confrontation of this issue and exposition and defense of the position I explicate here, see 
Eleanor M. Fox, Chapter 11 “Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation: How to Protect Competition Without 
Protecting Competitors”, in European Competition Law Annual 2005: What Is An Abuse of A Dominant 
Position?, Ehlermann and Atanasiu (eds.), pp. 69-77, Hart Publishing (2006).  
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principles—unless and until an objective, non-ideological review of experience demonstrates 
their inadequacy to ensure fair and efficient competitive exploitation of the Internet miracle. 
 
The Verizon blunder:  does it demonstrate the need for network neutrality legislation? 
 
In late September of 2007, in a master-stroke of ineptitude, Verizon Wireless unwittingly 
performed the major public service of forcing liberal opponents of legislatively-mandated 
network neutrality, such as I, to look to the internal consistency of our several views, by—
initially—refusing to make its mobile network available for a text-message proffered by the 
National Abortion Rights League.  The responsible employee did so, he said, in accordance with 
the Company’s asserted policy against distributing content that “may be seen as controversial or 
unsavory to any of our users”
59 The refusal, almost immediately reversed by a wiser higher 
management,
60 brought down a storm of protest and widespread assertions that this was exactly 
the kind of practice that statutorily mandated network neutrality would be intended to prevent.  
Perhaps significantly, the New York Times did not relate its condemnation of the initial Verizon 
action specifically to its long-time advocacy of such legislation, condemning it instead simply as 
a case of “textbook censorship” and calling upon the Federal Communications Commission 
merely to 
quickly issue regulations that … bar interference with text messaging: 
 
“Freedom of speech must be guaranteed, right now, in a digital world just as it has 
been protected in a world of paper and ink.”
61
 
Those of us with long memories will recall that this was the vision also of the “fairness 
doctrine”—the obligation of radio and television broadcasters, in exchange for the gift of 
valuable rights to the spectrum, to air or permit use of their networks as open forums for the 
exchange of ideas, prominently including political views.  That obligation was, however, 
rescinded by the FCC in 1985
62 on the plausible ground that the “market place for ideas” had 
become sufficiently diverse and competitive to render it not only unnecessary but in conflict with 
                                                 
59   Adam Liptak, “Verizon Rejects Text Messages from Abortion Rights Group,” New York Times, September 27, 
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60   Adam Liptak, “Verizon Reverses Itself on Abortion Rights Messages,” Ibid., September 27, 2007. 
 
61   “The Verizon Warning,” New York Times, October 3, 2007, Page A24. 
62   Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC RCD 5043  
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freedom of speech for the government to impose “neutrality” obligations on any one or all of the 
participants.
63  And that recidivism or its supporting logic was evidently the basis of the Progress 
and Freedom Foundation’s Adam Thierer’s scornful reaction to the New York Times editorial: 
 
The perversely named Fairness Doctrine, which threatened licensed broadcasters 
with fines if they didn’t “afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of 
conflicting views,” as the government defined it, has shown up in the news again 
recently, as federal lawmakers and liberal media activists have called for 
increased regulation of a media marketplace that they feel is spinning out of their 
control. But the push to reimpose the doctrine—which the Reagan administration 
abandoned in the late 1980s as obsolete and harmful to free speech—may be 
mostly a diversionary tactic. The Left has a much bigger target in its regulatory 
crosshairs: the Internet. Over the past few years, many of the same policymakers 
and activists who have long trumpeted the Fairness Doctrine have advocated that 
its rough equivalent apply to Internet service providers. And they’ve come up 
with another Orwellian term for the proposal: “net neutrality.”  
 
In theory, net-neutrality regulation would ban Internet operators from treating 
some bits of online traffic or communications more favorably than others, 
whether for economic or political purposes. Proponents of net neutrality use the 
same kind of fantastic rhetoric to describe it that they once used for the Fairness 
Doctrine: it’s a way to “save the Internet” from “media barons,” they say, who’re 
apparently hell-bent on controlling all our thoughts and activities….. 
 
It’s a brilliant tactic by the Left. Why exert all your energy attempting to reimpose 
“fairness” mandates on broadcasters alone when you can capture them, and much 
more, by regulating the entire Internet? After all, in a world of media convergence 
and abundance, bright lines dividing distinct media sectors or their products have 
vanished.  Everything from TV shows to text messages run on multiple networks 
making the old, broadcast-oriented Fairness Doctrine a less effective means of 
reestablishing a liberal media monopoly.  So the liberals got smart and came up 
with the perfect solution:  use net neutrality as the backdoor way to reimpose the 
Fairness Doctrine on the entire media marketplace.
64
 
The logic of the fairness doctrine was, however, not the basis of my dismay at the original action 
by the misguided Verizon executive.  It was, instead, its violation of the historic common 
carriage obligations of franchised communications companies:  they have no business examining 
and interfering with messages transmitted over their facilities. 
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My above-mentioned colleague, William Taylor, an incisive opponent of network 
neutrality legislation, allows me no such easy escape: 
If I’ve got that right, the obvious question then arises: what is it about 
legislatively-mandated network neutrality [which you oppose] that differs from 
your view of the “quo” that a cable/telco might reasonably owe, stemming from 
its historical monopoly franchise?
65
 
His question is shrewd:  Can it be that the “olive branch” I offer to progressives is actually the 
whole tree?  How can I, logically, oppose a legislative mandate of “network neutrality”, while at 
the same time reaffirming the historical obligation of franchised utility companies to act as—
neutral—common carriers of whatever content is offered them—an obligation effectively 
acknowledged by the higher Verizon official who reversed his hapless subordinate? 
My response is that network neutrality legislation, in contrast, would seem to deny 
carriers the right to differentiate their charges, non-discriminatorily, on the basis of the 
respective technical requirements of the messages—that is, in reflection of their differing short-
term opportunity and long-run investment costs—and impede their recovery of heavy common 
investment costs truly discriminatorily, in economic terms—that is, necessarily, on the basis of 
what the respective traffics will bear, even if not anti-competitively in intent or effect.
66  
My hope is that we can retain that obligation of common carriage, reinforced by 
prohibitions of unfair competition, without recourse to legislatively-mandated “network 
neutrality,” with its ignorant blanket prohibition of “discrimination” and invitation to all the 
other trappings of traditional public utility-style regulation to determine whether actual 
discriminations were or were not “reasonably” required for the recovery of joint and common 
costs. 
 
From Prohibitions to Active Consumer Assistance 
 
  In most versions of the prohibition of unfair competition of which I am aware, the 
prohibition is extended—either explicitly or by interpretation—to “deceptive” methods or 
practices. 
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  Even after making allowance for my generation’s (or at least my) especial discomfort, if 
not bewilderment, when confronted with the decisions forced on consumers by rapidly changing 
telecommunications technology and service offerings, it seems to me that the task of making 
intelligent choices has become excessively complex even for succeeding generations.   
Paradoxically, that complexity has been intensified by the competitive pressures on cable, 
telephone and wireless companies to satisfy the apparent preference of most consumers for 
paying in a single bill for what used to be separate “local” and “long-distance” telephone service, 
broadband access—of varying speeds or capacity—as well as video.  Confronted as I am with 
multi-paged monthly telephone company bills—including wireless—in the $160 range and 
separate cable company bills in the $80 range, with varying combinations of wireless charges for 
placing and/or receiving calls, varying special discounts for varying periods of time and—one of 
which I was not even aware until recently—forbiddingly high wireless service termination 
fees—I am reminded forcefully each time of Oscar Wilde’s complaint, “The trouble with 
Socialism is it takes up too many evenings”.  While resigned acceptance has become the rational 
choice for most of us individually, I have difficulty accepting that it represents the rational 
situation for consumers collectively—one example, I take the liberty of pointing out, of what I 
described some forty years ago as “the tyranny of small decisions.”
67
That observation provides me with the opportunity to conclude this extended criticism of 
Progressives on the conciliatory note of proposing agreement that government prohibition of 
“unfair” methods of competition should in the present circumstances be interpreted broadly, not 
merely to proscribe practices likely to be deceptive or misleading to a large body of consumers 
but to prescribe forms of bills that disclose in simple terms what each item or group of items is 
and what alternative options are available.
68
As I lack the ability or the will to have penetrated the thicket of time-varying bundled 
offerings as a consumer, I have no particular competence to suggest ways in which it might be 
perfectly consistent with liberalism for a government agency to play such a more active role.  
One of the olive branches that a liberal extends to “Progressives” is a solicitation of their 
collaboration in framing legislative or administrative proposals to this end—although enactment 
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of a “wireless consumers bill of rights” such as has been introduced in the U.S. Senate
69 might 
well recall Bismarck’s analogy between the making of laws and sausages. 
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